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HYBRID JUDICIAL CAREER STRUCTURES:
REPUTATION VERSUS LEGAL TRADITION

Nuno Garoupa, and Tom Ginsburg'

ABSTPACT
Scholars have distinguished careerfrom recognition judiciaries, largely arguing thatthey
reflect different legal cultures and traditions. We start by noting that the career/recognition distinction does not correspond perfectlyto the civil law/common law distinction,
but rather that there are pockets of each institutional structure within regimes that are
dominated by the other type. We discuss the causes and implications of this phenomenon, arguing that institutional structure is better explained through a theory of judicial
reputation/legitimacy than through a theory of legal origin or tradition. We provide
some preliminary empirical support for our account.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Comparative lawyers have contrasted the "career" and "recognition" models of
judicial organization. The career judiciary, in which judges join the judiciary at
a young age and remain there for their entire careers, refers to the system
prevalent in most though not all civil law jurisdictions. The recognition judiciary, in which judges are appointed later in life in recognition of other career
achievements, is frequently associated with the USA and most common law

jurisdictions (Posner 1996).
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See, among others, Georgakopoulos 2000.
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The career and recognition systems are usually seen as involving a cluster of
institutional characteristics that reinforce each other. For example, in career
judiciaries: (i) judges are initially appointed to junior positions either in trial
courts or assisting senior judges; (ii) judges are promoted to senior positions at
later stages, culminating in positions on the Supreme Court; (iii) tenure is not
attached to a particular position but to the entire career; and (iii) transfers to
courts of equal seniority are generally allowed.4 Frequently, the appointment
mechanisms used in civil law jurisdictions insulate career judiciaries from political considerations, sometimes through the use of powerful judicial councils to
mediate between politics and judicial management (Garoupa & Ginsburg
2009a,b). Furthermore, many civil law jurisdictions have created and developed
judicial training institutes to train young lawyers who opt for a career in the
judiciary, reinforcing the image of judging as a distinct profession.
Recognition judiciaries, by contrast, tend to include the following institutional features: (a) Judges are selected after an initial career related to the legal
professions; (b) Judges are not usually promoted; (c) Tenure is in many cases
for life, and is attached to a specific court, and (d) transfers to courts of equal
seniority rarely occur (Ramseyer & Nakazato 1999).5 A recognition judiciary
tends to rely on appointment mechanisms that involve the other branches of
government, and therefore are usually more politicized in nature (including the
use of direct election in some states of the USA) (Georgakopoulos 2000). A
position in the judiciary does not demand any particular previous training or
experience as a judge.T
The distinction between career judiciaries and recognition judiciaries is not
unproblematic. In fact, the labeling may be misleading in some ways. In Britain,
judges traditionally tended to be selected from among those who have served as
barristers and later as Queen's Counsel (or King's Counsel). All current justices
of the UK Supreme Court were recruited from the English and Scottish appellate courts (High Court of Justice, Court of Appeal and Court of Session). Some
scholars have seen this as a form of career (Posner 1996). In Israel, most
appointments to the Supreme Court are individuals who have served previously
as clerks. Although India's constitution provides that the composition of the

4

Id.

5

"Where an American judge might be appointed to the Northern District of Illinois, a Japanese judge
is not appointed anywhere. Instead, he is simply a judge."

6

However, such experience could enhance the likelihood of obtaining nomination for a higher court.

7

See also Bingham (2009) detailing that only eleven Law Lords had no previous judicial experience.
The appointment of Justice Sumption (QC but without previous judicial experience) in May 2011
was extremely controversial.
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Supreme Court can include lawyers of high recognition, it is overwhelmingly
dominated by the senior judges from the states' high courts (Neuborne 2003;
Iyer 2007).8 In the USA, all but one of the current Supreme Court justices have
served previously in appellate courts, confirming a trend established long ago
(Klerman 1998). These recognition judiciaries have some careerist elements.
However, we should distinguish these forms of "career" in three substantial
ways. First, career judiciaries are fundamentally dominated by a bureaucratic
approach to the career, in which apolitical seniority considerations are central,
while recognition judiciaries have an informal or unstructured "career"
mingled with a selection mechanism that is more politicized in nature.
Second, judges in career judiciaries have a judicial position as the formal first
step in the career, while judges in recognition systems start in a non-judicial
position. Finally, as noted before, transfers to courts of equal seniority are
generally part of the career path in career judiciaries but not in recognition
judiciaries.
At the same time, we should not neglect the rich diversity of arrangements
within each category. If we look at the Supreme Courts of U.S. states, it is easy to
observe different selection mechanisms, all within the broad category of recognition judiciaries. However, as easily observed from Table 1, the size of these
courts is fairly stable across states and across selection mechanisms (in unreported analysis, we also calculated the average age of the current justices and we
could not find significant variation within U.S. states).
The remarkably consistent size of these courts across the USA contrasts
dramatically with the Supreme Courts of Brazilian states, where the numbers
presented in Table 2 show considerable variance. Unlike the Supreme Courts of

8

Based on the Federal Court of India under the British, the Supreme Court ofIndia was constituted in
1950. It had seven justices, six (including the Chief Justice) had served in the British court. The
composition of the Supreme Court of India has been expanded five times by constitutional amendments. The current composition is 26 justices. The selection of justices has been a matter of political
tension. As to the appointment of the Chief Justice, there was supposed to be a norm that the senior
justice becomes Chief Justice, a norm imposed by the Court itself in 1951. Indira Gandhi violated the
rule twice (1973 and 1976) to impose her candidate against senior justices (there were resignations at
the Court as consequence). The seniority principle was reaffirmed in 1978 and since then has been
followed. As to the selection of associate justices, the Indian Constitution is ambiguous in the effort
to avoid both the British and the American models. Appointments should be achieved by consultations between the executive and the Chief Justice. Inevitably problems emerge when there is disagreement. The practice is for the executive to dominate. Three famous judicial cases have shaped
the process (1982, 1994 and 1999) and minimize political influence by creating a powerful collegium
of the five most senior justices (at the expense of the Chief Justice). This collegium has reinforced the
trend to pick senior judges from the states' high courts. The system of collegium has currently been
challenged before the Supreme Court of India (http://ww w.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/Print/

681311 .aspx, last accessed June 3, 2011).
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Table 1.

American States' Supreme Courts

State

Court size

Mechanism of appointment

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho

9
5
5
7
7
7
7
5
7
7
5
5

Election
Merit selection
Merit selection
Election
Appointment
Merit selection
Merit selection
Merit selection
Merit selection
Election
Merit selection
Election

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

7
5
9

Election
Merit selection
Merit selection

Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma (Civil)
Oklahoma (Criminal)
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota

7
7
8
7
7
7
7
7
9
7
7
7
5
5
7
5
7
7
5
7
9
5
7
7
5
5
5

Merit selection
Election
Election
Appointment
Merit selection
Appointment
Election
Election
Election
Merit selection
Election
Merit selection
Election
Appointment
Appointment
Merit selection
Merit selection
Election
Election
Election
Merit selection
Merit selection
Election
Election
Appointment
Appointment
Merit selection

Tennessee
Texas (Civil)
Texas (Criminal)
Utah

5
9
9
5

Election
Election
Election
Merit selection

Vermont
Virginia
Washington

5
7
9

Merit selection
Appointment
Election

West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

5
7
5

Election
Election
Merit selection

Source: Websites of the American States' Supreme Courts.

a
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Table 2.

Brazilian States' Supreme Courts

State

Court size

Specialized section on
constitutional review

Acre
Alagoas
Amapa
Amazonas
Bahia
Ceara
Distrito federal (Brasilia)
Espirito Santo
Goias
Maranhao
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso do Sul
Minas Gerais
Para
Paraiba
Parana
Pernambuco
Piau

Rio de Janeiro
Rio Grande do Norte
Rio Grande do Sul
Rondonia
Roraima
Santa Catarina
Sao Paulo
Sergipe
Tocantins

9
15
9
19
35
43
35
23
35
24
30
31
127
28
19
110
39

No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes

17

No

179
15
45
19
6
59
285
13
12

Yes
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No

Source: Websites of the Brazilian States' Supreme Courts.

U.S. states, all Brazilian courts in Table 2 have the same selection mechanism
(four-fifths are career judges while one-fifth are appointed through recognition
mechanisms). Even though the Brazilian Constitution demands that these
courts address constitutional review en banc, the larger courts have organized
a (smaller and manageable) specialized section to address such questions, due
to the large number of judges on the entire court. In short, there are considerable variations in relevant institutional variables within any given system.
Each judicial model raises different challenges in terms of incentives and
performance. Furthermore, the precise design of the mechanisms for judicial
appointment-assessment, selection and removal-provides for a specific relationship with the relevant external and internal audiences (Garoupa & Tom
2009c, 2010). By internal audiences, we mean those that operate within the
judiciary itself, typically more senior judges charged with supervising inferior
judges. By external audiences, we focus on other branches of government,

O
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lawyers, law professors, litigants, and the public more generally. These incentives tend to be reinforced by other aspects of the judicial system, including the
possibility of issuing separate opinions and dissents, sentencing and procedural
discretion, the scope of appeals (for example, de novo review), the use of citations, the court's powers to select cases and control the docket, the management and budget of the court system, and the size of the courts. Not
surprisingly, the career and recognition judiciaries emerge in very different
institutional settings (Id.).
The distinction between career and recognition judiciaries is useful to identify general approaches to the balance between independence and accountability. It is also important to analyze particular incentives and institutional
attributes.9 In particular, identifying the relevant institutional design can help
inform models to evaluate and discuss legal reform. However, in order to
understand the proper functioning of any particular judiciary, we cannot rely
exclusively on this particular classification because it is too general and probably too divorced from other important institutional details.
We believe that the key distinction between career and recognition judiciaries
corresponds generally with our own approach to the study of the judiciary. Our
framework is based on a team production model of judicial organization
(Garoupa & Ginsburg 2009). Career systems emphasize collective reputation
(in which internal audiences prevail over external audiences); recognition systems emphasize individual reputation (thus targeting more openly external
audiences). Collective reputation emphasizes collegial aspects of the judicial
profession. Individual reputation focuses on the particular salience of a given
judge. The choice between collective and individual reputation depends in part
on the primary social function of the judiciary, such as social control, dispute
resolution or lawmaking.10 We believe that collective reputation dominates
when the legal system emphasizes social control: hierarchical systems reduce
agency costs by allowing superior levels to supervise lower levels. On the other
hand, when judges are delegated with the task of lawmaking, ex ante screening is
a better device to ensure optimal law. In our view, these observations help in
explaining why we observe a dominant structure within any particular legal
systems.
At the same time, by distinguishing different functions of the judiciary, our
own model helps to elucidate the particular balance between the career and
recognition models exhibited in any given system. The judicial role in social
control and lawmaking are present in all legal systems, although with different

9 See different approaches by Posner (1993, 2005, 2008).
10 This distinction comes from Shapiro (1981). See also Damaska (1986).
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degrees of intensity. Not surprisingly, pockets of career (recognition) judiciary
develop in legal systems dominated by recognition (career) judiciaries in areas
that are better served by a different institutional arrangement. For example, in
constitutional law, where lawmaking is presumably the dominant function of
judges engaging with the grand principles of democratic governance in
high-stakes issues, most common and civil law jurisdiction use recognition
judiciaries. On the other hand, in many areas of administrative law, where
social control of lower officials is the more relevant consideration, both
common and civil law jurisdictions have shown a strong preference for
career judiciaries. Administrative law involves the control and monitoring of
technical decisions by experts, frequently involving relatively low stakes; constitutional law involves establishing the general principles regulating the role of
government, and hence usually has higher stakes.
Our theory explains the relevant differences between career and recognition
judiciaries from a novel perspective. It also helps to understand why legal systems favor a mix of the two, rather than a pure institutional design. From this
starting point, we argue that all systems are institutionally hybrid, and there are
good reasons to be so.
Legal scholars tend to argue about the merits of career and recognition
judiciaries as pure types. For example, career judiciaries resemble a bureaucracy, and so raise issues of shirking and sabotage of the agency's mission that
are familiar to organizational theorists (Posner 2005). Not surprisingly, we
observe a formal reliance on codes and significant procedural limitations to
constrain the judges, limit their ability to sabotage the law, and decrease the
costs of monitoring their performance (Posner 2005; Arrunada & Andonova
2008a,b). As a result, a career judiciary is methodologically conservative and
systematically unadventurous, and unwilling to acknowledge its role in lawmaking (Posner 2005). Strict rules predominate, especially at the level of ideology. Recognition judiciaries are different. They are dominated by lateral entry;
and promotion is of little significance to the individual judge. Since ex ante
quality is easier to observe, judges are less constrained and tend to apply more
flexible standards as opposed to clear rules (Id.). There are two possible behavioral consequences for the recognition model. First, the judiciary is more politicized (but not necessarily more democratic since it might not follow the
legislator). Second, recognition judiciaries will be more creative in establishing
and developing precedents (presumably inducing higher rates of reversal)
(Id.)."

11

Although it is difficult to compare rates of reversal across systems when the legal importance of
precedent varies.
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Our point is that precisely because each type of judiciary has different institutional implications, legal systems tend to use both. We do not observe career
and recognition judiciaries in their pure form, but instead see the types interact
in a given legal system within a particular contextual and historical experience.
In short, we observe hybrid arrangements. Obviously the particular mix of
career and recognition varies across countries. We recognize that, notwithstanding hybrids, one type of judiciary tends to dominate in any given legal
system. This might in fact be an artifact of historical factors: particular institutional patterns may become established through contingent factors and
remain relatively stable thereafter (Arrunada & Andonova 2008; Glaeser &
Shleifer 2002).x However, by neglecting the presence and persistence of
hybrid systems, the existing literature has failed to understand the coexistence
of both ideal types and its implications. We offer an institutional account of the
emergence of hybrids using the principal-agent model, while recognizing that
the dominant structure in each system might still be explained as a result of
historical contingency and limited convergence (Legrand 1996, 1997, 1999;
Garoupa & Ogus 2006). Another way to express our idea is that legal systems
develop a default institutional arrangement due to historical and contextual
factors. However, the default arrangement can be modified, depending on institutional needs and responding to significant contextual changes, thus promoting the existence of pockets. For example, as we will elaborate in some detail
later on, higher courts in civil law jurisdictions were traditionally made up of
exclusively career judges following the classic French model. However, these
courts have evolved to partially accommodate a recognition structure (usually a
particular fixed quota of the new appointments to the court).
We should distinguish our account of hybrid systems from the standard
comparative law literature. Comparativists describe Louisiana, Scotland, or
South Africa as hybrid or mixed legal systems, focusing on the coexistence of
code law and case law (or more mundanely, the application of both common
and civil law in those particular jurisdictions) (Palmer 2007). We are less concerned with the formal sources of law than the institutional structures of judicial organization. Therefore, we argue that most, if not all, legal systems are
institutional hybrids. In a sense, our understanding of hybrid legal systems is
narrower since we are only looking at institutional structures, and not substantive or procedural law. However, as a consequence of our approach, the pool of
hybrid legal systems is much broader than the one usually considered by

12 Legal economists have suggested possible rational explanations for the development of career
judiciary.

O
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comparativists, since it is difficult to find a pure type legal institutional arrangement that pervades an entire system.
The simple observation that legal systems frequently combine career and
recognition judiciaries (although in different ways and degrees) indicates that
pure solutions are unlikely to be optimal in institutional terms. Our theory
explains positively and normatively why hybrids are the norm and seem to be
more functional than pure types. In mathematical language, if jurisdictions
maximize the net benefit from their institutional arrangements, a combination
of career and recognition judiciaries is generally optimal whereas corner solutions are suboptimal.
The article is structured as follows. First, we motivate the discussion by
providing several prominent examples of the coexistence of career and recognition judiciaries. In Section 3, we provide our theory of pockets. In Section 4,
we discuss the implications of the analysis, and provide a preliminary empirical
analysis in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the article.
O

00. EXI7.MPLES OF POC(V-'rs

In this section, we consider several prominent examples of pockets: recognition
judiciaries in the traditionally "careerist" civil law, and career judiciaries in
common law jurisdictions usually considered to be "recognition" systems.
O

2.1. Recoqnition Sytms n C

Law

2.1.1. Cortitutioral!judges

The design of most constitutional courts in the Western world has been influenced by the original ideas and legal theories of Hans Kelsen (1942) (for a
general discussion see Sweet 2000). Kelsen emphasized a normative hierarchy
of law. Under his legal theory, ordinary (career) judges are mandated to apply
law as legislated or decided by the parliament (the legislative branch of government). Consequently there is subordination of the ordinary (career) judges
to the legislator, and judicial review of legislation would be incompatible with
the work of an ordinary court. Hence, only an extrajudicial organ can effectively
restrain the legislature and act as the guarantor of the will of the constitutional
legislator. The Kelsenian model proposes a centralized body outside of the
structure of the conventional judiciary to exercise constitutional review,
namely a constitutional court.13
From its origins in interwar Austria, this model has spread around the world
and is now a conventional choice for constitutional designers. The application

13 Const. Austria, Arts. 137-148 (1920).
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of the Kelsenian model in each country has conformed to local conditions, so
there are a variety of institutional designs with different judicial competences,
access, composition, and appointment mechanisms. Kelsenian-type courts for
constitutional review exist now in most European countries of the civil law
tradition, with the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries being the most
striking exceptions. Also most former communist Central and Eastern countries have now developed a similar institutional structure. Korea, Thailand,
Taiwan, Colombia and Chile, among others, also follow this model.
The centralization of constitutional review in a body outside of the conventional career judiciary has been attractive during periods of democratization
after a period of an authoritarian government in many countries in Europe,
Asia and Latin America. The career judiciary is usually suspected of allegiance to
the former regime, and hence, a new court is expected to be more responsive to
the democratic ideals contemplated in the new constitution. 4
The particular composition of constitutional courts differs across the world,
but the appointment mechanisms tend to be political in nature. Unlike the
traditional career judiciary, which is politically insulated and generally subject
to some form of judicial council, constitutional judges are selected in a manner
closer to the recognition model. They are usually chosen by a combination of
the other branches of government (executive and legislative) and, in some cases,
third parties (law societies, the judicial council, even the military in the Turkish
case); Table 3 provides some examples in Europe. In practice, in most countries,
a large fraction of constitutional judges is originally from the career judiciary; in
some countries there is even a mandatory minimum quota for career judges in
the constitutional court. However, the politicization of the appointment mechanism is inevitable, thus making it significantly different from the standard
career judiciary.
In some instances, there is a de facto quota system. Each political party has a
number of slots on the court, and new appointments are the product of party
negotiations with little resemblance to judicial appointments in other courts.5
The main consequence is the alignment of the preferences of the constitutional
judges with those of the political parties, not surprising given that political
interests tend to prevail in the selection of candidates (Garoupa 2010). In
turn, the perception of a politicized constitutional court (mostly because of
the selection and appointment mechanisms) generates conflicts with the career

14 On the prestige of constitutional courts, see Garoupa & Ginsburg (forthcoming).
15 This also applies to renewal of judicial terms. Generally speaking constitutional judges have a fixed
term in office, although Belgium and Austria, for example, have life tenure subject to mandatory
retirement.

U
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Selected European Constitutional Courts
Germany

France

Year of creation
Composition

(1951)
(1958)
9
16
8 by the
3 each by
Bundestag and President,
8 by the
Senate and
Bundesrat
National
Assembly

Term duration
Renewable term

12
No

Minimum number 6
of career judges

9
No

0

Italy

Spain

(1955)
(1979)
15
12
5 each by
4 by Congress,
President,
4 by Senate,
Parliament and 2 by
Judiciary
Government
and 2 by
Judiciary
9
9
No
Yes, once (if the
previous term
was less than
3 years)
5
2

Portugal
(1982)
13
10 by Parliament
and 3 by
Constitutional
Court

9
Yes, once (before
1997), No
(after 1997)
6

a

judiciary that populates the ordinary courts, which we have described elsewhere
(Garoupa & Ginsburg forthcoming; Garlicki 2007). Significant fluctuations in
the political composition of the constitutional court tend to exacerbate these

L

conflicts (Id.).

2.1.2. Connercial courts in Hrnce

The French commercial courts (Tribunaux de commerce) are not populated by
career judges (Kessler 2009). It is a system of courts that can be traced back to
1563 and survived the important reforms of the professionalization of the
French court system. The enforcement of the 1807 Code du commerce is entrusted to these courts staffed only by businessmen that deal with litigation
concerning commercial matters (including company law, bankruptcy, business
contracts including unfair competition and patent litigation). These lay judges
are elected for terms of 4 years by the members of the local chamber of commerce after practicing as businessmen for at least 5 years.16 In the court, they sit
in panels of at least three.' Commercial litigation is dominated by oral proceedings unlike the general arrangements in the civil law tradition. They are
considered to be reasonably fast as compared to the regular courts. There are
few appeals to the Cour d'appeal and even fewer reversals. 8

16 Only the court recorder (greffier) has legal training. See Bell, Boyron & Whittaker (2000).
17 Simple cases are heard by the president and around 30 percent by the three judge panel, see Bell,
Boyron & Whittaker (2000).

18 Id.

,C-
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judiciaries in Higher Courts
Many civil law countries reserve some places at the higher courts for non-career
judges, usually introduced as lawyers, prosecutors or law professors recognized
by the appropriate committee as of high merit. For example, in Spain, under
some conditions established by law, lawyers and law professors can become
judges at the higher courts without previous experience serving as lower court
judges (they are called the cuarto turno in reference to the fact that it used to be
the case that the three previous hiring seasons had to be completed with career
judges). The process of appointment is administrative in nature (involving an
examination plus assessment of merits), but they are conceptually closer to
recognition judiciaries. A similar example is found in Brazil, where the
President can appoint up to one-fifth of the federal appellate judiciary from
among lawyers and prosecutors. Such judges are called the quinto constitucional
by virtue of the fact that they constitute one-fifth of the judiciary in the higher
courts. The remaining seats are taken by career judges. The quinto constitucional
candidates are suggested by the law society and the federal prosecution body
respectively. The President picks up one name out of the three suggested
(Oliveira & Garoupa 2011).
Another example can be found in Japan. While the lower courts are populated with career judges, the Supreme Court is different. The justices are appointed by the Prime Minister and include a mix of career judges from lower
courts, law professors, prosecutors, bureaucrats, and lawyers. The appointment
mechanism is potentially politicized and many believe that the Supreme Court
appointees tend to be aligned with the preferences of the ruling party. 9 In
France, the Conseil d'Etat is the supreme administrative court. There is a separate career for the judiciary in the regular courts and in the Conseil d'Etat
However, the appointment to the highest rank in the Conseil d'Etat is open to
highly prestigious bureaucrats and lawyers (called the tour dxterieur they are
suppose to constitute a third of the new conselleirs d'Etat appointed
every year).20 In the Netherlands, entrance to the judiciary is open to lawyers,
law professors and civil servants with a law degree. They are evaluated by a
committee on the merits that usually proposes a training period before making
2,12, Recogiition

19 See Ramseyer&Nakazato 1999. But see Haley 1998, 2007; Law2010. See also Haley 2002 ("By nearly
all accounts, Japan's judges are collectively the most politically autonomous and individually the
most honest in the world, as well as among the most trusted.").
20 A similar mechanism applies to the intermediate rank, maitres de requeres; one quarter of the selected
candidates should be from the tour exterieur.

TO
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a final recommendation to appointment. The outsiders account for 70 percent
or more of all judges now.21
2.1.4. Other soecialized courts

Many civil law countries have specialized courts for electoral matters, military
courts, or courts for certain specific business matters (such as antitrust law,
intellectual property, or bankruptcy). Usually these courts are not composed of
career judges, but of individuals who are subject to a special selection and
appointment process. Specialization in the particular relevant area of the law
is generally the main criteria for these judiciaries. The special selection and
appointment process is frequently more administrative and less political in
nature, but nevertheless different from the standard career judiciary, and the
judges usually have an ambiguous relationship with the ordinary judiciary.
While these specialized judges are part of the judiciary, they are not always
perceived as such by the ordinary (career) judiciary.
O

2.2. Cavear Systems in thie Cwrnrotn Lm

Despite the general view that the USA and UK have recognition judiciaries, this
imagery is drawn from higher judiciaries in both countries: the federal judiciary
in the USA and the group nominally identified as "judges" in the UK. But the
fact is that most judges in both the systems operate in structures that look more
like career judiciaries than recognition ones. This is especially apparent in administrative law, in which judges are utilized as monitors of government
agencies.
2.2.1. Administrative law judges ir the USA

Administrative law judges (ALJs) in the USA appear to be a hybrid institution.
They are established by the Administrative Procedures Act to act and are considered to be "Article I judges" meaning that they are part of the Executive
rather than the judicial branch (which is set up by Article III of the U.S.
Constitution) 22 They sit within particular agencies, and in many cases their
decisions are considered to be subject to being overturned by the head of the
agency. These decisions can be appealed to the federal courts under the APA,
and the ALJ decision is part of the record to be taken into account when
reviewing agency action.23 Nevertheless, they are guaranteed independence

21

See the words of Mr Nichoras Schipper (President of the Committee for Selection of Judges in 2003)
http://mvw.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/meetings/20030202_2.html (last accessed June 3, 2011).

22

5 U.S.C. § 556.

23

Universal Camera v. NLRB (194X).
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and insulated from the line staff of agencies (Harders 1999).24 ALJs are appointed on the basis of a comprehensive written and oral test, 25 and so entry to
the profession looks much more like the merit-based "career" approach than
the political process used for the federal judiciary. They can be fired only for
good cause, based on a decision by a Merit Systems Protections Board that sits
outside the agency.
America states also have systems of administrative law judges, though there is
a good deal of variation in the structure of the system. Several states have central
panel systems for administrative law judges, so that all agencies share a pool of
ALJs (Rich 1983; Thomas 1987). In other states, administrative law judges sit
within the agency, paralleling the federal system. In either case, they serve in a
hierarchical bureaucratic career model characterized by merit selection and
long careers.
There are thousands of administrative law judges in the USA, in both the
state and federal systems. They form the primary decision-makers for hundreds
of thousands of decisions, and hence ought to be considered part of the overall
judicial apparatus in the country. Clearly this pocket is a significant and important one, in terms of the number of cases they decide and the impact they
have on ordinary people's lives.

22J.2, Trib ji4-, in the UK'

While it is true that the senior judiciary in the UK is appointed nearly exclusively from the ranks of practicing barristers, there are other systems within the
British judiciary that look more like career systems. The British system of tri26
bunals is established to hear cases against the administration. There has historically been great diversity within the tribunal system and many cases,
especially involving specialized areas are decided by panels in which only the
chairman is legally qualified. But recent years have seen efforts to standardize
the tribunals system, ensuring that the judges who sit in it are qualified and are
independent. They are now subject to appointment from the Judicial
Appointments Commission, and some five hundred of them sit full time.

24 An exception is immigration law judges, who are "attorneys whom the Attorney General appoints as
administrative judges" and are appointed to act "as the Attorney General's delegates in the cases that
come before them".
25

See Etelson (1991) (critiquing the exam structure).

26 Not all British tribunals are established to hear cases against the administration. For example,
Employment Tribunals hear cases brought by employees against employers, including for alleged
discrimination.
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2.23. Miiary judiciaries
Military judiciaries are another career system within the common law tradition.
In the U.S. armed forces, Judge Advocates General (JAGs) join the military soon
out of law school and will typically spend their whole career within the military
service. They undergo special training soon after joining to qualify for the judge.
In some branches, they form a separate corps, while in others they are line
officers who can be pulled into active duty. JAGs serve as military prosecutors
and defense counsel in trials, as well as providing legal advice to the command.
Some JAGs will serve as military judges in courts-martial cases. Cases can be
appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeals staffed by appellate military judges.
The apex of the system is a Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, which is
similar to the federal judiciary in that its appointees are nominated by the
President and approved by the Senate. The basic military judge is appointed
by the Judge Advocate General in each service. The judges form a standing
judiciary that is independent of the parties to the case, and military judges
cannot be removed or unseated improperly.2
The British military justice system is partially civilianized in that the Judge
Advocate General corps, whose "judge-advocates" preside over courts-martial,
and the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, are both civilian arms of the government
independent from the military (Sherman 1973). Nevertheless, the tradition of
British military justice has differences from the U.S. model (Fidell 2000).

8

-

O

2.3

Supra-!Nztional Judicial Re-vie

International bodies tend, by their nature, to be "recognition" structures in
which judges are appointed by nation states from among senior lawyers, diplomats, and academics (Mackenzie et al. 2010). They serve limited terms (although in some courts such as the European Court of Justice may be subject to
reappointment) and are not promoted (though lateral movement across international regimes is possible). In this sense, they resemble the U.S. Federal judiciary rather than the prototypical French judge, even though many of them
are drawn from civilian systems.
Some of these bodies, including the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Justice,
play an effective supervisory role over national judiciaries, so that cases can be
appealed from the national to the supranational level. In Europe, at least, this
means that they constitute a kind of pocket within the dominant career model;
though to the extent that they supervise courts in the UK and Ireland, they
reinforce the recognition structure that is already dominant. These

27

United States v. Lewis, 63 M.J. 405(2006).
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supranational courts, by their nature, are heavily involved in quasiconstitutional review and serve a lawmaking function.
The relationship between these "recognition" supra-national courts and the
national career judiciary in Europe has not always been straightforward. The
nature of EU law is derived from the expansionary character of the European
Court of Justice, whose active judicial lawmaking has resulted in profound
transformations in the governance of the Union (Sweet 2004). It is unlikely
that the role of the European Court of Justice would be the same if it had been
designed as a conventional career judiciary (Alter 2009). At the same time,
national courts have reacted to the ECJ in different ways. Initially, national
courts were cautious about the interventions of these "recognition"
supra-national courts. However, as the European courts established a good
reputation and high prestige for lawmaking in relevant areas, national courts
have acknowledged the importance of general principles of law over codification and shifted from mere social control to more active lawmaking. Such
change has raised concerns about the role of a career judiciary in dealing
with legal activism (Lasser 2004, 2009).

3

THEORY OF JUDICIAL POCKETS

We have demonstrated that the traditional distinction between the common
law operating a recognition judiciary and civilian systems operating a careerist
one is not fully accurate. What might explain the hybrids we observe? The
traditional account of the choice between career and recognition judiciaries
relies on legal culture and tradition. The common law system developed a
prestigious judiciary because of its evolution from among the King's officers
over many centuries. In turn, the U.S. federal institutional design was a strategic
response to the perceived shortcomings of the British model. The civil law
system fostered career judiciaries as a mechanism to comply with the predominant ideology of state positivism and to ensure legal certainty, particularly in an
atmosphere of distrust of judges in the early 19th century. Prior to that time,
France had a form of recognition judiciary, but after the codification of the civil
law, judges were viewed as being subservient to the will of the legislator. The
choice of career or recognition judiciaries was therefore historically determined
by different local concerns and ideologies, and, according to many, these initial
choices persisted so as to have long-run effects on legal institutions.
However, these historical and cultural explanations leave little space for
understanding the current trends within both types of judiciary, unless pure
path dependence persists. They also fail to grasp the hybridization of legal

E
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systems in terms of institutional settings that seems to be a feature of many
real-world systems.

Another set of accounts focuses on the development of institutional structures as a solution to commitment problems on the part of rulers. According to
this literature, the historical development of constitutional structures, including
an independent judiciary, arose out of a need for monarchs to tie their hands
and make promises credible (North & Weingast 1989). This literature has
focused on contingent factors that led to divergent historical experiences, as
well as the consequences of institutional choices. We view the precommitment
framework as complementary to the agency framework that we develop below,
but do not take a stance on which particular form of judicial organization that
we consider is superior in terms of commitment.
We provide an alternative account of alternative institutional structures. Our
departing point is the principal-agent model of the judiciary, which has been
applied with some success in particular national contexts in recent years.28 In
the model, each society has a sovereign, modeled as a unitary actor, that is, the
principal. The principal might be the people in a democracy; the government;
or an individual in a monarchy. The principal hires judges as agents to accomplish a certain set of tasks. We assume that these tasks include, in every legal
system, some amount of judicial lawmaking, as well as a degree of routine social
control and dispute resolution functions (Shapiro 1981; Damaska 1986). The
precise balance between these three functions is fixed for our purposes. The task
for the principal can be seen as hiring, within a budget constraint, a set of agents
involving a mix of high skills (making new law) and lower level skills (applying
pre-existing rules to factual situations). The high-skill agents have more human
capital and hence are more expensive, though they may also find it easier to
shirk (since they are better at deceiving the principal since they have an informational advantage). Low-skill agents may be more malleable. Due to these
differences in quality of potential agents, there are tradeoffs between hiring large
numbers of low-skill agents and a smaller number of high-skill agents.
Judges are like any other agent in that there are agency costs involved in
hiring them. Judges may wish to pursue their own vision of justice, or may exert
insufficient effort. Loosely speaking, there are two fundamental sources of
agency costs in this context. One is that the preferences of the judiciary may
be isolated from those of society. In other words, the judiciary attracts the
wrong kind of individuals from the perspective of the principal. This is a standard adverse selection issue. The other potential problem is that the judiciary is

28

See, among others, Laides & Posner 1975; Tollison & Crain 1975; Crain & Tollison 1979;
McNollgast 1999.
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not sufficiently incentivized to perform well and therefore prefers to expropriate from the principal some of the benefits of its performance. Shirking is the
classical example, but this category could also include judicial development of
doctrines that benefit the judiciary directly rather than society, such as procedural rules that empower judges or force the society to allocate more resources to
the judiciary. The most extreme example of judicial expropriation is corruption. These kinds of moves can be seen as raising a moral hazard problem.
Adverse selection and moral hazard generate significant agency costs in every
legal system. However, the balance between them varies, and this may lead to
different institutional solutions. The institutional designer has a variety of
mechanisms to control agency costs. These are familiar. One can "screen" by
requiring that agents engage in costly signaling before hiring, through investment in activities that indicate fitness for the job;2 9 one can shape the composition of the bench in terms of which agents serve on it; one can encourage or
constrain agents to be loyal to the principal by virtue of institutional devices
such as requiring the following of legal precedent, and controlling of dockets
and jurisdiction; one can hire superior agents to supervise the lower level agents
in a hierarchical structure; and one can set up external monitors to watch what
judges are doing. The first three solutions deal with the adverse selection problem, while the latter two focus on the moral hazard problem.

U

O

Adverse SehecfionTO
Addressing adverse selection frequently requires more screening on the principal's side and more signaling on the agent's side. The creation and disclosure of
information concerning the preferences of potential judges is necessary to minimize the misalignment between the goals of the principal and the goals of the
agent. The recognition judiciary seems to be a better option to address these
issues. Reputation and prestige with external audiences provide more disclosure
of information, and previous experience in a legal profession can be used as a
proxy to identify judicial preferences. The more intense politicization of judicial
appointments associated with the recognition judiciary merely reflects the importance of scrutinizing preferences and avoiding a bench that does not mirror
society. By addressing more strongly the adverse selection problem, a system
with a recognition judiciary can more easily rely on the judges to engage in the
high-skill activity of lawmaking since they tend to reproduce more accurately
the options favored by society. On the other hand, the costliness of the
3..

29

See Teles 2008 (describing how early membership in the federalist society serves as a costly signal
among conservative jurists).
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screening process raises the costs of hiring, and so we would expect fewer judges
to be hired.
It is also possible that, once hired, judges will be more susceptible to moral
hazard. This might be particularly true if one thinks of the principal as a political party that initially supports the judiciary but loses out of power. However,
if the principal is society, alternation in power may enhance the alignment of
preferences between principal and agent (Ramseyer 1994). Political and procedural checks and balances have to be used to avoid excessive agency costs due
to moral hazard. Developments in many common law jurisdictions seem to be
largely responding to these issues (for example, attempts to curb excessive
judicialization of public policy, the growing importance of statute law, and
the use of sentencing and procedural guidelines to minimize judicial
discretion).
There are institutional factors that are relevant to understand the impact of
adverse selection. Binding precedents, docket control, and judicially created
doctrines on justiciability (including the political questions doctrine), are associated with recognition judiciaries but hardly observable in legal environments
with career judiciaries. If the screening mechanism is effective and the misalignment of preferences between agent and principal is minimized, the legal system
can develop institutional practices that make lawmaking by courts more effective. Not surprisingly, courts with recognition judiciaries tend to issue binding
or absolute precedents, exert some form of docket control (not necessarily as
generous as the writ of certiorari),and address justiciability questions and conflicts of jurisdiction. If the screening mechanism does not provide for a judiciary with aligned preferences, we tend to observe institutional features that
heavily constrain judicial lawmaking. Opinions are explanatory or clarifying of
legal rules but not precedential, there is little to no docket control, and justiciability questions and jurisdictional conflicts cannot be addressed by the court.
This description applies to courts dominated by career judiciaries. In fact, in
civil law countries, precedent erga omnes, docket control (by some form of
procedural rules of access), and jurisdiction over justiciability questions and
jurisdictional conflicts are common features of the constitutional court (recognition judiciary) and not of the Supreme Court (career judiciary), consistent
with our theory.

32. Mora Hazard

Directly tackling moral hazard usually requires control of agents through monitoring and ongoing evaluation based on output. In the context of separation of
powers, the principal cannot do this directly, and so a career judiciary might
emerge as the appropriate mechanism to reduce moral hazard. Hierarchical
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control, systematic monitoring by a specialized agency composed of judges,
periodic rotation to avoid too much local control of expertise and knowledge
are consistent with the idea of reducing moral hazard. The shortcoming with
this solution is that the principal has little direct control over judicial selection,
thus enhancing a potential adverse selection problem. Codification and strict
limitations on case law are useful to effectively constrain the judiciary and force
conformity with the preferences of the principal.30 Codes that enhance clarity
and minimize interstitial lawmaking emerge as a cost-effective technology for
reducing preference asymmetry (Halperin 2006).3 While codification is the
common law world is regarded as a mere instrument of organizing legislation
in a more systematic and coherent way than dispersed statute law, even this may
be effective in restraining the judiciary because it imposes internal consistency
and reduces significantly the need for judicial interpretation and creativity.
Specialized training encourages the so-called esprit de corps (we could translate
as strong professional norms) that induce adherence to legalism and its emphasis on the illegitimacy of judicial lawmaking, thus minimizing agency
slack.32

We have explained how the choice between career and recognition judiciaries
can be understood in the context of identifying and reducing agency costs in the
form of adverse selection and moral hazard. The career model emphasizes
hierarchical supervision to deal with moral hazard and internalized professional
norms (esprit de corps) to deal with adverse selection. The recognition model
emphasizes ex ante screening to deal with adverse selection and external monitoring (through transparent opinions, and the existence of monitors of the
courts) to deal with moral hazard.
Corruption can be seen as evidence of a severe moral hazard problem.
According to our model, if a particular jurisdiction has a significant concern
about judicial corruption, it should favor a career judiciary because the mechanisms of monitoring are more appropriate. Some countries, such as India,
seem to have shifted away from a traditional recognition judiciary into a more
career judiciary because appointments by elected politicians are seen as

30

Merryman & Perez-Perdomo (2007). For codification as a form of limiting the judiciary in a systematic and significant way (addressing preferences and cognitive biases), see Arrufiada & Andonova
2008.

31

Legislative precision and transparency in order to effectively restrain the judiciary were one of the
goals of the Code Napoleon.

32

The illegitimacy of

judicial lawmaking is codified by Article 5 Code Npoleo The juds are
forbidden to pronounce, by way of general and legislative determination, on the causes subitted to
them). On the importance of esprit de corps, see Steiner (2010).
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inducing or supporting corruption in the bench. Although this would raise
natural questions about democratic legitimacy and the role of the principal,
in the context of our model, the argument would be that the traditional institutional design fostered, rather than reduced, adverse selection (from the viewpoint of the corrupt preferences of the politicians).
It is likely that the balance of these agency costs change over time with
political, economic, and cultural factors. However, it is also the case that
within any given legal system, it is likely that some areas of law raise more
adverse selection concerns and other areas of the law raise more moral hazard
concerns. In particular, the high skill areas of law, where judicial lawmaking is
needed, rely on selecting agents to exercise discretion responsibly, and hence the
adverse selection mechanisms are predominant. Lower-skilled areas, in which
judges are simply applying pre-existing rules, require less expertise, but raise
moral hazard problems of shirking.
For example, consider constitutional law or electoral law. It is likely that the
principal is more concerned about the preferences of the judiciary being aligned
rather than shirking or expropriation. Lawmaking in these two areas is of capital political importance. Therefore, recognition judiciaries should tend to prevail in constitutional adjudication or electoral disputes. At the same time,
higher courts are more likely to address socially and economically relevant
principles of law than lower courts that deal more systematically with facts.
Adverse selection concerns are likely to predominate in higher courts whereas
moral hazard is the greater concern in lower courts. This could explain why civil
law jurisdictions develop some pockets of recognition judiciaries in higher
courts.
The opposite is true in areas such as administrative law or military law, in
which the job of the judiciary is essentially to serve as a monitor of lower level
government agents.33 These tasks are more routine, and hence less likely to
involve high-skill recognition judiciaries. In this context, social control is a
major goal, and not easily be subverted by the judiciary. Not surprisingly,
career judiciaries tend to predominate in these areas of the law.34
Our quantitative exploration in a later section seems to largely confirm these
observations. We find a strong correlation between the use of recognition

33

It should be clear that we refer primarily to administrative adjudication and not to administrative
law in the quasi-constitutional sense as suggested by Ginsburg (2011). We also exclude here disputes
between private parties, which can be addressed by administrative agencies in the USA but are not
"administrative law" in the civil law sense.

34 The classification of lawmaking and social control also applies to more technical areas of the law
such as intellectual property or anti-trust law. Notwithstanding the general approach, some areas of
the law could be more about lawmaking in one jurisdiction and more about social control in a
different jurisdiction.
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judiciaries and constitutional adjudication. At the same time, we find little to no
correlation between the use of recognition judiciaries and administrative adjudication. Further confirming this evidence, there is negative correlation between constitutional adjudication and administrative adjudication (a court
invested with powers to exert constitutional review is not likely to be invested
with identical powers to exercise administrative review).
Of course, many areas of the law, if not all, combine lawmaking and social
control. We have provided two extreme examples, constitutional law and
administrative adjudication. What about areas of private law such as contracts,
torts or property, or criminal law? Since they involve both judicial roles,
the principal has to supplement the selection mechanism with an institutional
design that minimizes agency costs. Recognition judiciaries address adverse selection problems; hence we should expect moral hazard to be the dominant concern when it comes to private law and criminal law. Not
surprisingly, we can observe the expansion of statutory law and judicial guidelines as a method to effectively monitor the judiciary. Career judiciaries address moral hazard problems; therefore adverse selection could be a significant
concern in private law and criminal law. As described before, we have
observed an expansion in the use of lawyers, prosecutors or law professors
recognized by the appropriate committee as of high merit in traditional
career judiciaries (mainly in the higher courts) and the development of specialized courts.
Institutional logic seems a better general explanation than mere cultural and
historical path dependency, which are highly localized accounts that are not
always falsifiable. First, the balance of agency costs derived from adverse selection and moral hazard varies and therefore explains the diversity of institutional
arrangements when it comes to selection and appointment of judges. Second,
unlike standard accounts, institutional logic provides a rational explanation for
the existence and persistence of pockets in certain areas of the law. Furthermore,
it also suggests that judicial reforms can move in one or the other direction,
depending on the particular type of agency problem to be corrected. Adverse
selection problems are likely to be addressed with recognition judiciaries
(reconfiguring the judiciary to reflect social preferences) whereas moral
hazard shortcomings induce a more structured career judiciary (developing
judicial councils or establishing stricter mechanisms of promotion). The diversity of judicial reforms in the last couple of decades attests to a variety of local
conditions that reflect one or the other type of agency costs.
To be sure, we recognize that agency problems may not differ that systematically across contexts. It may be that some of the continued divergence among
systems is indeed attributable to path dependencies from initial conditions.
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Our argument, though, is that the partial convergence on hybrid models call
into question "purist" descriptions now dominant in the literature. 3

4.

IMPLICATrioNS

There is an institutional logic to the preference for a combination of career and
recognition judiciaries in the form of a dominant institutional design with
pockets of the other available alternatives. The advantage of combining recognition and career judiciaries is clear. It addresses agency costs by picking the
appropriate institution when adverse selection and moral hazard are the main
concerns. It tends to a more structured hierarchy with more rigid codification
when moral hazard needs to be minimized, using pockets of recognition judiciary in areas of the law that raise concerns about judicial preferences. It favors a
more politicized selection mechanism and a more diffused organization when
adverse selection emerges as the main source of apprehension, introducing
pockets of career judiciary where shirking or expropriation is socially more
costly.
The hybrid system combines the benefits of both institutional solutions. It
implicates both internal (judicial) and external (mainly political) audiences.
Hence a more appropriate balance of incentives is provided, rather than focusing on a particular one. Internal audiences enhance collective reputation.
External audiences provide for opportunities to engage in individual reputation
building. The combination of both presumably reduces potential conflicts between collective and individual reputation building as we observe in pure types.
Career judiciaries tend to sacrifice individual reputation. Recognition judiciaries put less weight on collective reputation. The existence of pockets
counter-balances the standard trends. Simultaneously, the hybrid model permits different social and professional backgrounds and diverse degrees of judicial training to coexist in the judiciary, therefore responding in a more specific
way to particular needs.
As a consequence, a hybrid system is also more accountable than each of the
pure solutions. As we have seen, it combines the accountability standards and
practices of both systems. Obviously they are combined in different degrees
depending on the relevance and importance of the existing pockets, but still

35

By no means we are the first to criticize or question the "purist" descriptions. However, our reasoning is different. Most of the previous critiques focus on the inability of the "purist" description to
explain a particular jurisdiction; in other words, the argument is that generalization does not inform
the discussion of a particular jurisdiction. We take the opposite approach. We suggest that generalization provides fundamental insights to understand the observed configuration in a particular
jurisdiction. We simply believe that the generalized "purist" description fails to do so.
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they promote a more overreaching design of institutional accountability. At the
same time, the coexistence of both models permits comparisons. From this
point of view, even conflicts such as those that have emerged between constitutional (recognition) judges and Supreme Court (career) judges in many jurisdictions, are welcome because they are informative and reduce the costs of
enforcing accountability. Each type of judiciary monitors the other one, thus
further reducing agency costs and exposing the shortcoming of each pure solution. In this light, conflicts of jurisdiction or skirmishes over procedural rules
are productive and help the principal detecting adverse selection and moral
hazard.
Clearly a hybrid system is not all about advantages. Otherwise legal systems
would expand their pockets of institutional design infinitely and eventually alla
converge to a similar institutional arrangement. There are significant costs with
allowing and promoting pockets that need to be accounted for when thinking
about these institutions. For example, internal rivalries and conflicts of jurisdiction provide information but also waste resources. They can hurt the normal
functioning of the courts. A conflict-ridden hybrid system could be highly
dysfunctional, therefore undermining appropriate lawmaking and hurting
social control.
More realistically, consistency and institutional compatibilities could be a
serious concern. Take codification. Enacting codes is more important when we
have career judges and less so when we have recognition judges. Once both
coexist, it might be difficult to manage the appropriate degree of codification,
which should be high in certain areas of the law and low in others. Another
example is procedural independence. As we explained before, it should be the
case that we need more independence for recognition judges and less for career
judges. When both coexist, either different procedural rules are developed, thus
creating the usual problems known in the specialized courts literature36 or they
are uniform across courts, hence reducing significantly the benefits of having
pockets.

Our account has a number of empirical implications for comparative law,
which are consistent with general observation. First, pure recognition judiciaries will be smaller than pure career judiciaries, because the cost of each judge
is higher.37 This seems consistent with general findings in comparative law.
Second, we will never see a pure recognition judiciary do primary administrative or criminal adjudication or mere law-applying tasks; we will never see a

36

See discussion by Dari-Mattiacci, Garoupa, & Gomez (2010).

37

In the context of Europe, see the data provided by the CEPEJ. For a discussion, see Cross & Donelson
(2010).
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pure career judiciary doing policymaking. Administrative courts are unlikely to
be staffed through recognition mechanisms, in other words. And constitutional
adjudication is almost always left only to the highest courts, formed through a
recognition model.
It is also the case that, if our theory is correct, we would never observe a
hybrid with recognition for low-level courts and career for higher level. Note
that one might, in theory believe this inversion of the current practice would be
a good idea, because career judges are more insulated from politics. But this
type of hybrid does not deal with agency costs and hence has not been tried.

S.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

We have constructed an original dataset to provide for some preliminary empirical testing of our theory. The dataset includes 133 higher courts from 73
different countries; the full list of courts included in the sample is available at
the Appendix Table Al (the sample includes 51 civil law countries and 22
common law countries).3 8 Generally speaking, for common law jurisdictions,
we include the highest court of the jurisdiction while, for the civil law jurisdictions, we include the various high courts, since they tend to have specialized
jurisdictions and multiple high courts. For example, France has three highest
courts: the Conseil d'Etat in administrative law, the Conseil Constitutionnel in
constitutional cases, and the Cour de Cassation for ordinary appeals.
For each of these 133 higher courts, we collect the following information:
(i) whether or not they have competence over constitutional review, indicated by a dummy variable (70 courts have competence over constitutional review while 63 courts do not);
(ii) whether or not they have competence over judicial review of administrative acts, indicated by a dummy variable (73 courts have competence over
judicial review of administrative acts while 60 courts do not);
(iii) whether the appointment mechanism to the court is mainly based on
recognition or career, as operationalized by whether the appointments
are professionalized or political (111 courts are mainly staffed with a
recognition judiciary and 22 courts are mainly composed of career
judges); 39 and
38 In our sample, Israel, Malta, and South Africa are included as common law jurisdictions while the
Philippines and Jordan are included as civil law jurisdictions. The empirical results are robust to
these classifications.
39 Further confirming that the vast majority of higher courts around the world are not packed by career
judiciaries as we have discussed before.
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Table 4.

Descriptive statistics

Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard
deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Size
Recognition
Constitutional powers
Administrative powers
Common law
Federalism
Population
GDP pc
WB rule of law
WB control of corruption
Mauro bureaucratic efficiency
Mauro ELF
DB contract
DB overall

118
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
132
73
83
127
127

26.75
0.83
0.53
0.55
0.19
0.26
42.74
25.87
66.38
64.72
7.38
27.11
60.02
58.54

33.56
0.37
0.50
0.50
0.39
0.44
111.46
30.61
25.84
25.69
1.74
27.66
47.97
41.31

3
0
0
0
0
0
0.033
0.322
0.9
1.9
4.33
0
1
1

250
1
1
1
1
1
1188.69
186.175
100
100
10
90
182
172

(iv) the size of the court: when the number of justices is specified by the
constitution, we use that figure; for other courts, we have counted the
current number of active judges (while recognizing that actual size may
vary slightly at any particular point in time).
We also include as control variables such as the legal family (common law or
civil law), the rule of law and control of corruption indicators of the World
Bank for 2009,40 federalism, 41 bureaucratic efficiency and ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores (Mauro 1995), GDP per capita for 2010,42 population estimates for 2009 " and the Doing Business 2011 rankings for contractual
enforcement (quality of courts) and overall ease of doing business. 4 Due to
missing data for some of these courts, we only have information about all the
variables for a smaller sample. The descriptive statistics are summarized in
Table 4.
Table 5 summarizes the basic correlations. All correlations are generally consistent with our model. Constitutional review is positively correlated with recognition mechanisms while administrative review is not (administrative review

40 http://info.worldbank.org/governanice/wgi/index.asp
41

http://wvw.forumfed.org/enifederalism/by country/index.php

42 GDP per capita in thousands of US dollars. We have used the IMF dataset except for Liechtenstein
and Monaco (World Bank, 2009).
43

Population estimation for 2009 in millions. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASI'ATISTICS/
Resources/POP.pdf

44 http://wvw.doingbusiness.com
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seems to be correlated with common law which is not surprising given they
generally have no specialized jurisdictions at the apex level). Size is heavily
reduced when we have recognition judiciaries and when courts exercise constitutional review. Although there is a positive correlation between recognition
judiciaries and common law legal origin, such relationship is much less significant than with constitutional review as our theory suggests. This correlation
alone suggests a modification of the legal origin story as the explanation for
judicial structure.
To fully understand the relationships, however, a multivariate model is necessary. Our primary dependent variable of interest is whether the appointment
to the court utilizes a predominately career or recognition model. The independent variables include the powers of the court in administrative and in
constitutional law, and the control variables (we only include one of the
World Bank's governance indicators since they are heavily correlated as we
can see from Table 5). In terms of institutional design, the appointment mechanism and the scope of constitutional law (in particular, the choice of which
court performs constitutional review) are likely to be decided simultaneously.
As a consequence, there might be an endogeneity problem with the powers of
the court in constitutional law. 45 There may be a missing variable that explains
both the choice of appointment mechanisms and whether to give the court
constitutional jurisdiction.
We start by estimating the probit regression with clustering by country (since
some countries have multiple high courts). Due to the potential endogeneity
problem with regard to constitutional jurisdiction, we estimate a bivariate
probit regression for both appointment and constitutional powers with clustering by country.46 Table 6 presents the regression analysis (the two simple
probits are reported as changes in probability). It shows the expected signs of
the coefficients according to our theory for constitutional jurisdiction. Notice
that there is no statistically significant effect for administrative jurisdiction on
recognition mechanisms (while it has a negative impact on constitutional jurisdiction). This non-result may be a product of the fact that we are looking at
apex courts; lower level administrative adjudication is careerist everywhere, but
some systems with a unified apex court may be likely to assign administrative
judicial review powers to the top court constituted by recognition mechanisms.

45

Notice that the same observation does not apply to administrative review since the choice of court
this matter is usually not a matter of constitutional law. In most civil law jurisdictions
it actually predates the current constitution by many decades. For example, the French Conseil d'Etat
can be traced to the Napoleonic revolution, while the current constitution dates from 1958.

jurisdiction in

46 We use STATA 11.
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Probit model of recognition appointment mechanisms

Table 6.

Probit

recognition
[change in
probability]
Constitutional powers

GDP pc
Population
WB rule of law
Federalism
DB contracts
DB overall

0.07
(0.05)
0.001
(0.002)
-0.0002
(0.0001)
-0.003*
(0.002)
0.04
(0.06)
-0.00002
(0.0007)
-0.0003
(0.0009)

0.62**
(0.06)
-0.38***
(0.08)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.002
(0.001)
-0.003
(0.004)
-0.03
(0.12)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)

Rho
Constant
Observations
Clusters
2

Pseudo R
Prob > X2

Bivariate
probit
recognition

Bivariate
probit
constitutional

0.34**
(0.09)

Recognition
Administrative powers

Probit
constitutional
[change in
probability]

127
70
0.3032
0.0068

127

70
0.2688
0.0000

-0.12
(0.24)
0.01
(0.008)
-0.0001
(0.0009)
-0.02**
(0.008)
0.19
(0.44)
0.002
(0.04)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.87***
(0.08)
2.49***
(0.75)
127
70
0.0002

-0.86***
(0.22)
0.01
(0.008)
0.003*
(0.002)
-0.01*
(0.009)
-0.06
(0.29)
0.005
(0.004)
-0.007
(0.005)
0.87***
(0.08)
1.27*
(0.71)
127

70
0.0002

Standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.

We also observe a negative effect for the World Bank's rule of law scores on
recognition mechanisms and constitutional powers, which could be driven by
some of the jurisdictions with recognition judiciaries that perform quite badly,
such as India, Kenya, Mexico, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Many of these poorly performing judiciaries are plagued with corruption, realizing the moral hazard risk associated with the recognition model.4

47 We also performed the analysis with the two other control variables, bureaucratic efficiency and
ethnolinguistic fractionalization scores. However, these regressions are only possible with a much
reduced dataset (they exclude all the former socialist countries in Europe). The econometric results
presented on Table 6 are largely robust.
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Table 7.

Models of court size
OLS

3SLS

Recognition

-53.63***
(12.14)

-73.12***

Constitutional powers

-12.29***

Administrative powers

(3.74)
0.92
(5.49)

Common law

-7.87**
(3.38)

Federalism
GDP pc

(6.87)
-16.24***
(4.21)
2.98**
(1.21)
-5.81* *
(1.22)

1.71
(4.66)
-0.05

-0.1*
(0.01)

Population
WB rule of law

(0.13)
0.01(0.01)
0.15
(0.13)

DB contracts

0.04

0.0001

(0.005)

DB overall

(0.07)
0.11
(0.06)

Constant
Observations
Clusters
2
Pseudo R

62.3 **
(21.2)
112

68
0.535

C

42

0.04***

(0.008)
98.3 1***
(3.83)
112
68

Si

C
Si
Si
Si
C

0.469

Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
so

The second dependent variable we analyze is the size of the court to test our
conjecture that recognition judiciaries are smaller. The independent variable is
whether the appointment to the court is career or recognition, and we include
the control variables as in the previous analysis. We estimate the regression with
ordinary least squares with clustering by country (for the same reason as
before).48 We argue that the endogeneity problem in this context is less
severe since, for most countries, the court size is either independent of constitutional design (for all those courts without constitutional powers) or set after
the initial constitutional design, in many cases, by later constitutional amendment (for example, India). However, in order to assure robustness, we also
present the estimations using a 3SLS (with recognition mechanisms and constitutional powers being the other two dependent variables and the remaining

48 In unreported robustness checks we also run a Poisson model, which is appropriate given that we are
analyzing count data, and a negative binomial model with both delivering similar results.

S
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control variables performing as instruments).4 9 Table 7 presents the results,
which indicate a strong negative relationship between recognition systems of
appointment and court size, even controlling for common law tradition. Courts
with constitutional jurisdiction tend to be significantly smaller than those
exercising administrative jurisdiction. The evidence suggests that judicial structure is explained by more than legal tradition, as argued by our theory, and that
institutional factors are important in understanding the design of courts.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Our article examines the distinction between the career and recognition judiciaries from a new perspective. We suggest that the design of judicial institutions
responds to particular agency problems, namely adverse selection (the misalignment ofpreferences between the judiciary and society) and moral hazard (shirking
and expropriation by the judiciary of the benefits created by social control).
We provide evidence that certain areas of the law are better served by career
judiciaries while others are better served by recognition judiciaries. Hybrid
systems try to supplement the choice of a particular pure arrangement with
some pockets of a different nature that can benefit certain areas of the law.
Constitutional law and administrative law provide two good examples. In systems dominated by career judiciaries, constitutional adjudication tends to be
assigned to recognition judges. In systems that are primarily based on recognition, administrative adjudication tends to be decided by career judges.
Consistent with the theory, we find that constitutional courts are smaller and
more likely to be composed through a recognition mechanism; we find no
statistically significant effect for administrative courts.
A mix of a dominant system with pockets of the other pure solution seems to
be an appropriate technique to address agency problems. However, we have
recognized that there are inevitable costs, including institutional inconsistencies
and incompatibilities. Conflicts between co-existing models may be informative
and productive (in terms of helping institutional monitoring) but also can
waste resources and be dysfunctional. Pockets therefore tend to be
self-contained and are usually not generalized to the entire court system.

49 We started with a two-stage probit least squares estimation (the routine cdsimeq in STATkA 11), but
the second stage regressions with instruments were affected by collinearity. This is not surprising
since this method is only recommended for a dataset with at least one hundred independent observations. We turned our attention to a 3SLS estimation that technically is less correct because two
dependent variables are binary. However, since we focus only on the regression with the continuous
dependent variable, the estimation results seem acceptable to us. The results on Table 7 concerning
the limited sample should be taken with extreme caution since the number of independent variables
is small.

-
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Rather, they are tailored to particular functions of the legal system and special
areas of the law. Because we see hybrids as responding to institutional needs, we
suspect that there will continue to be evolution in observed patterns. For example, we might imagine that all systems will eventually shift toward appointment after at least a medium-length career (as in the recognition model)
followed by possibilities of promotion, transfer, etc. (as in the career model).
This might solve adverse selection problems on the front end while addressing
moral hazard on the back end, though it could also exacerbate other problems:
late appointment with subsequent promotion might lead to pressures to politicize the promotion process to an even greater degree than is currently found
in recognition judiciaries.
There are two important implications of our article for legal reform. First, we
provide a useful taxonomy to identify areas of the law that could benefit from
different institutional arrangements. At the same time, such changes should be
limited and significantly constrained by the potential costs we have enumerated.
Second, in contrast with the influential literature on legal origins, our agency
cost approach is one in which judicial reform can potentially overcome historical and cultural path dependence. If the nature of agency costs changes in a
certain jurisdiction, we suggest that policy-makers ought to, and frequently do,
respond by considering institutional reforms to the judiciary to address the new
conditions. Obviously there are short-run costs to institutional change, including sunk costs of human capital and institution-specific assets. However, at
minimum, our approach shifts the explanatory focus away from institutions
predetermined by fate of history into a more productive incentive analysis with
greater capacity to explain variation across time and space.
In our view, the structure of judicial institutions is not predetermined by
history, although the historical context is obviously important. Instead we see
institutional structure as responding to broader incentives within any particular
jurisdiction. From a positive perspective, hybrid judiciaries have emerged in
many jurisdictions because the default regime (career or recognition) was not
the most appropriate in certain areas of the law. From a normative perspective,
we suggest that hybrid judiciaries are attractive because variation in agency costs
across different areas of the law and different political environments shape
optimal institutional design in a variety of ways. Our approach thus provides
a theoretical basis for comparative law beyond categorization by legal origin.
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Appendix A
Table Al.

List of courts included in the dataset

Country

Court

Albania
Albania
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Austria
Austria
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belarus
Belarus
Belgium
Belgium
Belgium
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Brazil
Brazil
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Canada
Chile
Chile
Colombia
Colombia
Colombia
Croatia
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Czech Republic
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
France
France
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Greece
Greece

Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Corte Suprema de Justicia
High Court
Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court of Justice)
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Administrative Court)
Verfassungsgerichtshof (Constitutional Court)
Appellate division of the Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Economic Court
Court of Cassation
Constitutional Court
Council of State
Constitutional Court
Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina
Supremo Tribunal Federal
Superior Tribunal de Justica
Supreme Court of Cassation
Supreme Administrative Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Tribunal Constitucional
Corte Suprema de Justicia
Corte Suprema de Justicia
Corte Constitucional
Consejo de Estado
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Administrative Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Conseil Constitutionnel
Cour de cassation
Conseil d'Etat
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)
Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice)
Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court)
Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court)
Bundesarbeitgericht (Federal Labor Court)
Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court)
Court of cassation
Special Supreme Tribunal
(continued)
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Table Al. Continued
Country

Court

Greece
Greece
Hong-Kong
Hungary
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Italy
Italy
Japan
Jordan
Jordan
Jordan
Kenya
Latvia
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Lithuania
Lithuania

Council of State
Chamber of Accounts
Court of Final Appeal
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Haestirettur (Supreme Court)
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Corte Constituzionale
Corte Suprema di Cassazione
Consiglio di Stato
Supreme court
High Council
Special Council
Court of cassation
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Oberster Gerichtshof (Supreme Court)
Constitutional Court
Administrative Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Administrative Court
Constitutional Court
Court of Cassation
Administrative Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court of Appeal
Constitutional Court
Constitutional Court
Court of Appeal
Federal Court
Suprema Corte de Justicia
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court or Tribunal Supreme
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
High Council
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Corte Suprema de Justicia
Tribunal Constitucional
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Tribunal

Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Macedonia
Malawi
Malawi
Malta
Malta
Malaysia
Mexico
Moldova
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Montenegro
Netherlands
New zealand
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Peru
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Poland

a

a

(continued)
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Table Al. Continued
Country

Court

Poland
Portugal
Portugal
Portugal
Romania
Romania
Russia
Russia
Russia
Serbia
Serbia
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Africa
South Korea
South Korea
Spain
Spain
Sweden
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Turkey
UK
Uganda
Ukraine
Ukraine
USA
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Zambia

Supreme Administrative Court
Tribunal Constitucional
Supremo Tribunal de Justica
Supremo Tribunal Administrativo
High Court of Cassation and Justice
Constitutional Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Arbitration Court
Supreme Court of Cassation
Constitutional Court
Court of Appeal
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Tribunal Constitucional
Tribunal Supremo
Supreme Court
Supreme Administrative Court
Federal Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Court of Cassation
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Supreme Court
Constitutional Court
Supreme Court
Tribunal Supremo de Justicia
Supreme Court
Supreme Court

a

